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WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT DO DURING THE 1952 TERM
Fowler V. Harper t and Arnold Leibowitz I
CONTRADICTIONS FROM THE COURT This is the fourth ' and last of a series of studies made in an attempt to throw some light on the operation of the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. On the whole, this has been a baffling and frustrating experience. One can get statistics by the simple process of counting and classifying. But it is far more difficult to get the information necessary to make meaningful the data on this phase of the Court's behavior. It is next to impossible to find out much about the several hundred cases which clog the Miscellaneous Dockets. Even as to cases on the Appellate Docket, one would need the time of the nine Justices and their staffs to have much confidence in his judgment. Nor has the Court itself been of much help. Indeed, the confusion, which these articles have emphasized if they have not removed, has, if anything, been confounded by the views of the Justices as expressed during the last term. Certainly the profession is no nearer an understanding of the effect of a denial of certiorari. Those of its members who took Mr. Justice Frankfurter at his frequently expressed word that a denial means only that fewer than four Justices vote to review, now have the uncomfortable assurance that four members of the Court Rnv. 439 (1953) . (427) think that it may mean a great deal more. Those of us who thought this all along find that four other members of the Court agree with Justice Frankfurter.
This explosion of contradictions came in February in a series of habeas corpus cases brought by state convicts under death sentences for rape and murder. 2 Only three months before, on the denial of a rehearing on a petition for a writ of certiorari by Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Justice Frankfurter had stated his usual position: "Misconception regarding the meaning of such a denial persists despite repeated attempts at explanation. It means and all that it means is, that there were not four members of the Court to whom the grounds on which the decision of the Court of Appeals was challenged seemed sufficiently important when judged by the standards governing the issue of the discretionary writ of certiorari." ' But now Justice Frankfurter finds that four of his brethren shared the "misconception," at least so far as concerned habeas corpus cases.
It is true that petitions by state prisoners for the writ of habeas corpus in federal courts present peculiar problems. One is whether the exhaustion of state remedies requires a petition in the Supreme Court for certiorari to the highest court of the state. While it is true, as Mr. Justice Jackson points out, 4 that it sounds silly to discuss a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States as a "state remedy," nevertheless Darr v. Burford 5 imposes such a requirement and, regardless of semantics, this seems to be accepted by all the Justices.
The cases involved review of judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, first argued in 1951, reargued in 1952 and decided in 1953 . In each case, petitions for certiorari in the Supreme Court for direct review of the convictions in the state court had been denied. On habeas corpus in each case, the federal district court, in determining the propriety of granting the writ, considered the effect of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari on the same constitutional questions. In so doing, the district judges had precedents both for and against such consideration. 6 To use Mr. Justice Frankfurter's 7. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489 (1953) . To this statement the Justice appended the following footnote:
"In No. 20, Daniels v. Allen, after speaking of the denial of certiorari the District Judge felt it difficult to believe 'that any impartial person would conclude in the light of the procedural history of this case that it clearly appears that petitioners were denied the substance of a fair trial.' He concluded the petitioners had had a fair trial, that the writ should be vacated 'because not available to petitioners on the procedural history, and if so, the petitioners are not entitled to discharge' since they did not substantiate their charges. Daniels v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 208, 213, 216 . The Court of Appeals stated that it was only necessary to consider the proposition that petitioners were not entitled to the writ in view of the procedural history of the case and affirmed, saying that petitioners could not by habeas corpus circumvent the results of their failure to comply with the State procedural rules. Their allegation of peculiar hardship in only one day's default in complying with State procedural rules was before the Supreme Court in their application for certiorari 'and, proper respect for that Court requires that we assume that, if it had thought that such enforcement of the rules of court amounted to a denial of a fair hearing to men condemned to death, it would have granted certiorari either to the Supreme Court [of the State] or the trial court and would have reviewed the case. The case falls squarely, we think, within what was said by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 ... ' Daniels v. Allen, 192 F.2d 763, 768, 769. "In No. 22, Speller v. Allen, the District Court stated that it 'felt strongly disposed to deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus solely on the procedural history' but decided to hear evidence on the merits. After hearing evidence, the Court dismissed, 'upon the procedural history and the record in the State Courts, for the reason that habeas corpus proceeding is not available to the petitioner In Brozwn v. Allen, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for himself and Justices Black, Douglas, Burton and Clark, explained at length the Court's difficulty in handling the many petitions for certiorari which each year jam its docket. Special attention was given to habeas corpus proceedings by state prisoners. Based on a study of the files of 126 8 such cases, he pointed out the unusual difficulty of determining the issues, much less the merits thereof. "As shown there," he said, "only 13 of 126 petitions were drawn by lawyers; others, of course, may have been drawn by lawyers either in or out of prison who did not choose to sign the petition. But our experience affirms the conclusion set forth in the survey based on one test of the legal adequacy of the petitions, that in a large number of cases, the petitions must be combed through to find the issues, certainly much more so than is true of the ordinary petitions for certiorari." ' Justice Frankfurter further emphasized the inadequacy of the records in many habeas corpus cases. He then points out that the delicacy of the relations between federal and state authority required some kind of a review by the Supreme Court of the state proceedings before an application to a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, but concluded that to hold a denial of certiorari to the state court the equivalent of approval of the decision would amount to a subversion of the Act of for the purpose of raising the identical question passed upon in those Courts. ' Further, even 1867,11 which defined the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction in habeas corpus. In conclusion, Justice Frankfurter said: 12 "The reasons why our denial of certiorari in the ordinary run of cases can be any number of things other than a decision on the merits are only multiplied by the circumstances of this class of petitions. And so we conclude that in habeas corpus cases, as in others, denial of certiorari cannot be interpreted as an 'expression of opinion on the merits.'"
Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring with the majority in affirming the decisions below but with the minority on the meaning of certiorari, cut sharply into the fiction that the denial of certiorari is meaningless:
"But now it is proposed to neutralize the artificiality of the process and counterbalance the fiction that our certiorari is a state remedy by holding that this step which the prisoner must take means nothing to him or the state when it fails, as in most cases it does.
"The Court is not quite of one mind on the subject. Some say denial means nothing, others say it means nothing much. Realistically, the first position is untenable and the second is unintelligible. How can we say that the prisoner must present his case to us and at the same time say that what we do with it means nothing to anybody. We might conceivably take either position but not, rationally, both, for the two will not only burden our own docket and harass the state authorities but it makes a prisoner's legitimate quest for federal justice an endurance contest.
"True, neither those outside of the Court, nor on many occasions those inside of it, know just what reasons led six Justices to withhold consent to a certiorari. But all know that a majority, larger than can be mustered for a good many decisions, has found reason for not reviewing the case here. Because no one knows all that a denial means, does it mean that it means nothing? Perhaps the profession could accept denial as meaningless before the custom was introduced of noting dissents from them. Lawyers and lower judges will not readily believe that Justices of this Court are taking the trouble to signal a meaningless division of opinion about a meaningless act. It is just one of the facts of life that today every lower court does attach importance to denials and to presence or absence of dissents from denials, as judicial opinions and lawyers' arguments show." 13 11. 14 STAT. 385 (1867).
12. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 497 (1953) . The opinion of Justice Frankfurter held that there was not only no basis for holding the denial of certiorari res judicat, but equally no basis for leaving the district judge free to guess whether the Court has passed on the merits. "The District Judge ordinarily knows painfully little of the painfully little we know." Id. at 494.
13. Id. at 542.
Justice Jackson finds some "order in the confusion" by the distinction between the effect of a denial of certiorari as stare decisis and as res judicata.' 4 Of course, it has no significance as a precedent, he argues, because it approves no principle entitled to weight in subsequent cases. As res judicata, writing finis to a legal issue and, perhaps, a human life, it has meaning as the Rosenbergs and countless others could corroborate if they could testify from the grave. Justice Jackson's position is at variance with the understanding and practice of the profession as to the first point, 5 and with the law as applied to habeas corpus proceedings as to the second." 8 A series of articles on certiorari, therefore, starts out with two strikes against it. First, there is the position of a majority of the Court that certiorari is meaningless; " second, the Supreme Court seldom says anything except "certiorari denied." Occasionally it admonishes the legal world that that is all that is being said.-
8
Reasons are rarely given, 9 and if stated are delivered with cryptic brevity as if to point up the secret. If this last is indeed its aim, it has apparently succeeded. Judging by the figures since the advent of the wholesale discretionary jurisdiction of the Court," 0 lawyers still do not understand 14. Id. at 543.
15. Lawyers constantly cite cases as precedents, adding "certiorari denied," with the appropriate reference.
16. Justice Jackson himself recognized the difficulty involved in the principle of res judicata as applied to habeas corpus proceedings.
17. Not only in the habeas corpus situation, supra, but as a general rule. Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Powe, 283 U.S. 401, 403 (1931) ; Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 75, 83 (1941) . This last case carries the view to an extreme. The district court originally dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. The case was then heard on the merits, and then once again took the hard road up to the Supreme Court. This time, the petition having been on the merits, the Court granted certiorari. It then realigned the parties, as a result found no diversity, and dismissed the case. Seven years had gone by. PA. L. REv. 439, 442 (1953) .
During this past term reasons for the denial of certiorari were delivered thirteen times. All cases were in forma pauperis. The reason given was always the same: the application was not made in time. This may be of some aid to convicts in prison, though it is highly doubtful. To lawyers, to be reminded that an application must be made in time can hardly be considered helpful. 20. 28 U.S.C. § § 1251 -7 (Supp. 1949 (originally granted in 1925 The percentages in this and the following footnote are based upon:
For the years 1927-1938-Articles on the annual business of the in HARv. L. REv. (1928 REv. ( -1940 (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) .
has shown no similar increase. 2 " When this expansion of the certiorari jurisdiction is coupled with the discretionary method of handling appeals -per curiam adjudication 2 6 on the merits either by a dismissal for insubstantiality 2 " or affirmance or reversal-practically the entire work of the Court is included. 2 " Thus, making known the criteria of review is a matter of concern.
Nevertheless, the Court has thrown little light on the subject. This has material consequences. A welter of cases means hurried decisions. This is not solved by the denial of review in many cases, in order that those cases that are decided can be decided more carefully. Such a procedure presumes a careful selection of cases for decision. 29 Time is needed to consider whether or not to review. Justice Frankfurter has commented:
"If the Court is limited in the number of cases it can decide, no less is it limited in the number it can decide not to decide." " Such a mass of petitions with their accompanying records and briefs gives rise to a feeling of oppression that is peculiarly hostile to the serenity and leisure indispensable to the best judicial work. Not only does it affect the 'mental climate' 28. The only cases that would appear to escape this are the few that are within the original jurisdiction of the Court. These constitute an infinitesimal part of the Court's work each term. During the past three terms, the Court decided five cases originating on the original docket. See Appendix Table III infra. 29. In NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563, 570-6 (1950) , Frankfurter, dissenting to the granting of certiorari, noted the consequences of granting review to the wrong cases as the following: (1) Has a bad psychological effect on the court of appeals; (2) Causes a waste of time which diverts the Court from other matters; and (3) Encourages hundreds of petitions which do not belong before the Court.
30. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1933 , 48 HARv. L. REv. 238, 277 (1934 in which the Court moves. It is bound to affect its sureness of judgment upon these certioraris. Considering the speed with which petitions must be disposed of, increase in numbers increases the margin of error. . . Plainly, the Court is operating under a stringent policy. But the circumstances under which it is employed-the pressure of the Court's business-make extremely difficult the application of the Court's avowed criteria.
The problem, then may be for the Court to crack down on the number of petitions coming before it. This can only be done by convincing a substantial number of losing attorneys that there is no sense in "taking this case right up to the United States Supreme Court;" but to make an attorney with a bothersome client admit this, the position of the Court must be made clear indeed.
Frankfurter and Hart, writing in 1934 on the Supreme Court, suggested that penalties for frivolous appeals be imposed; 12 but although there are precedents 3 and statutory authority for this, 3 it is not now used. They also suggested the use of a system of substantial costs, similar to that of the English, to discourage unmerited applications.3s But the value of this system depends in large measure on the ability of the attorney to judge beforehand how meritorious the case is.
Their other suggestion appears to be more valuable. It is for the Court to give reasons for the grant of certiorari in the course of writing its opinion. While this has in some measure been followed," 6 unfortunately the value of these statements has been diminished by their vagueness.
7 However, it is not adequate even if it were fol- Term, 1928 , 43 H.imv. L. REv. 33, 47 (1929 .
Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Some idea of the pressure can be gained by the quotations and commentary in
STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUrREM
CouRT PRACTICE 126-7 (1950 lowed more fully. There are certain types of cases in which certiorari should not be granted. These cannot be determined by an examination of the reasons for granting the writ in proper cases. The hope that breathes eternal in a losing client will require more than a negative pregnant to stop his asking the Court for review. Further, the Court may not always be justified in granting certiorari; at least in the opinion of some Justices. 3 8 There are numerous instances in which certiorari has been dismissed as improvidently granted, 9 and even in cases which were heard, Justice Frankfurter has sometimes stated his dissent thereto.°P rofessor Louis Jaffe, in dealing with the problem of getting some certainty into this field, suggested three other alternatives: 41 (1) reintroducing appeals in certain areas; (2) "attempting the rather futile task of further refinement of standards for the grant of the writ;" and (3) requiring reasons for refusal when one or more of the Justices dissent.
The first alternative begs the question to some extent, since if the Court could agree on which areas, it might be equally easy to follow a discernible pattern in granting certiorari. Furthermore, it is not in point here, though this is no fault of Professor Jaffe, since the adoption of the proposal would not result in the lightening of the Court's burden unless a corresponding elimination of appeals in certain areas is instituted. A determination of which areas leads to Professor Jaffe's second alternative.
This alternative is dismissed in the process of stating it by calling the idea "futile." The third is presented as the most feasible. It is not an adequate solution, however, since frequently the disagreement is over importance and in the absence of prior standards of importance, this might not be very helpful. Various Justices have subject matter and issue prejudices, which are already well-known, and there would seem to be little to be gained except to bring these disagreements into the open. But the idea has merit insofar as it should encourage the statement of opinion when it becomes apparent to the Court that many cases on a particular matter have no chance of 38. ". . . when comparison is made between the issues at stake in petitions that have been granted and those in which petitions have been denied, the contrast is at times glaring." NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563, 573 (1950) (dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter).
39. This happened to three cases this past term. 41. Jaffe, The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARv. L. REv. 107, 110 (1951 .
success. This has been done, but infrequently.
4 2 For example, in Gaines v. Washington, 43 Justice Taft wrote: "It has not been the practice of the Court to write opinions and state its reasons for denying writs of certiorari, and this opinion is not to be regarded as indicating an intention to adopt that practice, but in view of the fact that the Court has deemed it wise to initiate a practice for speedily disposing of criminal cases in which there is no real basis for jurisdiction in this Court, it was thought proper to make an exception here, not to be repeated, and write an opinion."
4
Despite the apologetic language, it would appear to be better for everyone concerned if this practice were more frequently used-to advise the profession officially, rather than in an unofficial or nonjudicial way 4 5 when a broad agreement of this type is reached.
Notwithstanding the conclusion of Professor Jaffe that a refinement of standards is futile, it is proposed here to analyze Supreme Court Rule 38-and suggest possible changes to make it more effective in its application. It is not thought that by these or any other refinements an attorney in every instance will know whether his case will be reviewed. It is hoped, however, by these proposals, in a significant number of instances to provide solutions, avoid bad answers, and in general improve the existing situation.
There are six guides theoretically used at the present time" 6 though none of these according to the specific language of the Rules is individually, or combined with others, completely controlling or limiting: 47 Before discussing each one of these separately, it should be noted that all six of these criteria cut across subject matter or issue and concern themselves, in one way or another, with the merits of the decision of the case. 48 Yet, for some reason, merit has been one of the standards specifically rejected by the Justices when they discuss the reasons for granting or denying certiorari. "Our rules adopted to carry out the policy of the statutes granting the power to bring cases here by certiorari have apprised the Bar and the public that we will not take cases fully heard and adjudicated below for the mere purpose of reexamining the correctness of the result." " Yet an attorney, on looking at the criteria set up by the rules, can assume that if his case was wrongly decided he might have a case to merit certiorari. In view of these criteria, it is not unreasonable to assume that if certiorari is denied, the inference may be drawn that the case is affirmed. 5 " Repeated denials of dertiorari may logically have this meaning if one takes the rule at face value. 1 Judging from the majority of the briefs for certiorari, this has been recognized by many practicing attorneys. How, then, can the Court 52 say one thing when the rule appears to state something else. The answer is that there has been interpretation, for the most part silent, which has made certain criteria crucial, others valueless; and has resulted in certain words being emphasized, others frequently ignored. What facts and figures there are bear this out.
48. In the rare case when the Court does not have a quorum of six qualified Justices [see 28 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1949) ], it appears that if a majority of those qualified note that the case should not be heard at the next term of the Court, the judgment of the court below is affirmed. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (Supp. 1949 This case had been discussed by an order to Isserman directing him to show cause why he should not be disbarred before the United States Supreme Court. In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953) . By such proceeding, however the court would appear to shift the burden of proof. [Vol. 102 cc... The record of the New Jersey proceedings before us leaves me with the belief that the state failed to afford petitioner the kind of a hearing required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although petitioner was allowed to appear before a local bar committee and to present a formal answer and make formal arguments before the State Supreme Court, the full record persuades me that he was denied an adequate opportunity to confront witnesses against him and to offer evidence in his behalf. Instead of hearing evidence and making its own findings the state court's order was based on findings made by a federal district judge who had summarily convicted petitioners of contempt without a hearing. I believe that a lawyer is denied due process when he is expelled from his profession without ever having been afforded an opportunity to confront his accusers and to present evidence to deny, explain or extenuate the charges against him. Another point which has become a major focus for the Court in applying this criterion is the implication of the phrase "question of substance." Of the three cases, this past term which the Court specifically stated were granted on this criterion, all mentioned "question of substance" as being the determinant. But the significance of this phrase is not so much in the granting of certiorari as in the handling of appeals from the state courts."' The two problems are similar.' Though Rule 12 applies to appeals from both federal " and state courts,6 4 it is appeals from state courts which were intended to be cut off and against which the rule has been most extensively 60. The late Chief Justice Vinson's clerks have noted in private talks his practice of asking for the names of the judges who decided the case below, in the preparation of the memorandum of a petition for certiorari. Presumably this had little purpose except insofar as it might bear on whether the case was correctly and reasonably decided.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1), (2) used. 5 Once again, the proportion of dismissal of appeals remains constant 0 0 and high despite the length of time in which the device has been in existence, the bar apparently being unable to fathom the mysterious factors which make a case insubstantial. As can be seen from the table in the note,"' "insubstantiality" is the hurdle over which most appeals fall." This insubstantiality often carries over to be the determinant of dismissal for want of jurisdiction 6 9 and even to a (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) . Figures for 1948 Figures for -1951 are based on the articles on the annual business of the Supreme Court in HARv. L. REv. (1949 REv. ( -1952 . These figures are at slight variance with the total appeals listed in the official figures and those used previously in this series, but since they include sources, they have been used here.
67. (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) .
68. Besides the figures given above, Ulman and Spears writing in 1940, stated that in the decade up to that time over 400 appeals bad been dismissed on the grounds of no substantial federal question being presented. Ulman and Spears, "Dismissed for Want of a Substantial Federal Question," 20 B.U.L. REv. 501, 503 (1940) .
69. "The distinction between an appeal affirmed in the jurisdictional statement and one dismissed for want of a substantial federal question is obscure. Both involve an adjudication that the claim asserted is without merit. In the latter case, supposedly, the lack of merit is so plain as to amount to a want of jurisdiction; in the former it is sufficient to furnish jurisdiction, although insufficient to justify presentation on briefs with oral argument." Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1933 , 48 HARv. L. Rsv. 238, 246 n.20 (1934 .
"No such distinction obtains in the treatment of district court appeals. The requirement of a showing of substantiality is now dispensed with under the rules. . . . An appeal in which the questions involved are 'so subtantial as not per curiam affirmance. 7 " Thus, the need for a guide to substantiality becomes all the more pressing.
It has often 7 been noted how comparatively infrequent are reversals in appeals from state courts. Of the appeals which are not dismissed the relation between affirmances and reversals is interesting. Curiously the results are almost in exact contradiction 72 to the certiorari cases where merit seems to be of importance. Here again, the Court usually refuses to give reasons. Usually no case or statute is cited."
In others, one or two cases may be cited; more than this number is unusual. Furthermore, the cases cited are frequently stock precedents affirming the right of the Court to treat an appeal summarily, rather than going to the point in issue. But even when the cases are on the issue, the effect of such dismissals is not such as to prevent further petitions. 74 It is recognized that not all appeals can be given a full hearing and be disposed of by opinion. The short-cut method is essential as in certiorari. The solution then, is to determine standards of substance which not only can be applied by the Court but which can be recognized by the profession. Court made the following distinction: "The federal question presented, being one which requires analysis and exposition for its decision, is not frivolous; and the motion to dismiss the writ of error is accordingly denied. The motion to affirm the judgment should, however, be granted if the questions on which the decision depends are found to be so wanting in substance as not to need further argument." This is cutting things a bit fine; too fine for the Harvard Law Review which in its Note on the insubstantial federal question rejected the distinction on functional grounds. "Since the procedure, practice, and the effect of the decision are substantially the same for both per curiam affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question, no distinction between these two methods of disposing of appeals is made in the following discussion. 74. Professor Hart illustrates this by the attempts to bring the flag salute cases before the Court and argues that psychologically the effect of these cryptic adjudications is to stimulate repeated efforts to have the case fully argued before the Court.
SECOND CRITERION
Conflict in circuits:-Of
"To earnest litigants, orders without reasons entered without plenary hearing do not carry the same conviction as a reasoned opinion." Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1937 and 1938 , 53 HARv. L. REV. 579, 605 (1940 .
furter and Hart writing on the 1927-32 terms stated that it appeared to be the reason for the grant of certiorari in more than half of the cases which they studied7 In subsequent articles the following figures are cited: In 24 cases plus 8 companion cases out of 45 cases where reason for review was given, conflict of circuits was stated to be the reason for review; 76 20 out of 39; 77 and 15 out of 45 .78 This past term, of the 35 cases in which a reason was stated for the granting of review, conflict in circuits accounted for 14. These figures appear so significant 79 that one might legitimately infer that it is normally a sufficient condition-controlling despite the preamble to Rule 38-to compel review. Modem text writers on the Supreme Court jurisdiction seem convinced of this. Thus, Stern and Gressman say, "The Supreme Court will usually grant certiorari where the decision of the federal court of appeals, as to which review is sought, is in direct conflict with a decision of another court of appeals on the same matter of federal law or on the same matter of general law as to which federal courts can exercise independent judgments. . . . the Court does not feel itself very free to deny review in the face of a square and irreconcilable conflict .
8,
. 0 Robertson and Kirkham state the rule even more strongly: "Where the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed by certiorari directly conflicts, upon a question of federal law," 1 with the decision of another Court of Appeals on the same question, the Supreme Court grants certiorari as of course, and irrespective of the importance of the question of law involved." 82 Lawyers, too, seem to follow this theory. In almost every brief for certiorari, there is an effort to find a conflict in circuits. And as far as the possibilities of telling when there is a direct conflict we are 202, 206 (1938) . In which the Court said: "As to questions controlled by state law, however, conflict among the circuits is not of itself a reason for granting a writ of certiorari. The conflict may be merely corollary to a permissible difference of opinion in the state courts."
An inference might be drawn from this that where federal law is concerned conflict in the circuits is a sufficient condition to require the granting of the writ. told that "for skilled lawyers, the issue of conflict, in the great majority of cases, comes close to mechanical determination." I Such a simple rule would be welcome; at least one instance of clarity amidst confusion. Unfortunately, it doesn't work out that way. Each year there are many cases which arise where a conflict in circuits exists but no writ is issued. Conflict in an important case is what is necessary, although Rule 38 does not say so.
Many commentators have given evidence that conflict is not the ticket to the Supreme Court. As early as 1933 Frankfurter and Hart questioned it, and pointed to "importance" as being significant, citing cases of conflict where no writ was granted, presumably because the issue in dispute was a minor and technical one." the rashness of the generalization in his treatise, has cited seven further cases 86 of admitted conflicts; and this series of articles has pointed out similar cases " of denial despite the conflict. If these alone are not sufficient to eliminate the possibility of a mechanical operation of certiorari, statements of the Court itself lend further weight. First, there is the tendency of the Court to stretch the concept in cases where certiorari has been granted; the writ is granted on an "asserted conflict in prin- Terms, 1935 and 1936 , 51 HARv. L. REv. 577, 596 (1938 ciple,""8 a "seeming conflict," 8 "statements made.
Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October
. which seemed to conflict with the conclusion below," o and an "alleged conflict" 1 in which the case alleged to be in conflict is not discussed at all. In these cases "conflict" seems to be a pseudonym for importance. Then there are cases where certiorari is granted because of conflict and then, as if this is not enough, because of their importance also.
92
This bi-lateral reason was given in three of the 14 writs granted on this point in the past term. The safe " conclusion seems to be that a gloss had been placed on a "conflict of circuits" so that it is fading into the "importance" of the issue. 387, 393 (1923) the Court spoke as if there were only two standards for certiorari and that they were mutually exclusive and sufficient to gain review: ". . . it is very important that we be consistent in not granting the writ of certiorari except in cases involving principles the settlement of which is of importance to the public as distinguished from that of the parties, and in cases where there is a real and embarrassing conflict of opinion and authority between the circuit courts of appeal. The present case comes under neither head."
93. Apparently not so safe. Despite this evidence a recent article in The University of Chicago Law Reziew takes the position that a conflict will compel certiorari, distingushing Stern's listings on the grounds that they were not direct, narrow conflicts. Terms, 1935 and 1936 , 51 H~Av. L. REv. 577, 595 n.32 (1938 The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARv. L. REv. 107, 182 (1952 . 100. Note, The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HARv. L. RFv. 89, 180 (1953 . 101. This figure excludes all cases in which any federal question or constitutional argument was raised in the petition. Since frequently a perfunctory constitutional argument is raised to dress up the case (e.g., the decision below for the plaintiff being so far against the weight of the evidence results in a taking without due process of law) if one were to eliminate review of diversity cases the number of petitions to be eliminated would undoubtedly be close to 70.
102. Some four cases-although probably more-were taken in 1948 based on 63 HARv. L. REv. 119, 125-7 (1950) .
None of these involved the application of this standard, however. The three arising under the application of Erie v. Tompkins were questions of whether federal or state law applied; the other raising constitutional issues.
103. The table is ambiguous on this point, it does eliminate a constitutional issue. 104. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Termn, 1933 , 48 HAx v. L. REv. 238, 272 n.84 (1934 .
105. Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 1936 , 51 HARv. L. REv. 577, 595 n.32 (1938 .
106. Ibid. 107. If one includes also the three cases in which it is combined as a reason with conflict in circuits and once when combined with a Supreme Court decision, the figure reaches 20, over one half of the cases in which reasons were given.
108. Frankfurter and Hart, supra note 104, at 271.
To a large extent this overlaps with the problem of the conflict in circuits; the two are frequently mentioned together. 9 It is, however, often used alone, in 1933 having been explicitly mentioned six times; 110 in 1934, nine times; "I in 1935, three; 112 in 1936, four; :" in 1952, twice, once combined with "importance." 114 Perhaps because of the injection of this latter, Frankfurter and Hart stated that it was difficult to know when certiorari would be granted." 5 The difficulty, of course, is whether the facts of the later case are so different as to make the earlier Supreme Court action inapplicable." 6
SIXTH CRITERION
When a circuit court has departed itself or sanctioned another court to vary from the usual course of judicial proceedings:-There is little to say concerning this except that it is just not used-at least no one has shown its explicit application by the Supreme Court. Frankfurter and Hart 1 7 found no case where it was used; and it was completely absent as a stated reason during this past term.
The conclusion to be drawn from this description of the operation of Rule 38 in practice is this. That actually the rule has only two standardk at most: the "substance" or "importance" of the question presented, and conflict in circuits. That the second to a large extent has also become a matter of "importance" seems clear. The word "important" is undefined, the Court seldom giving concrete meaning to the phrase which actually is crucial to petitioning lawyers. However, informed guesses may be made.
From the discussion above and the table below,""' one element of importance in the Court's view can safely be said to be the merit of the decision below. In short, as Mr. Micawber would say, "who won?" This is despite the frequent admonition of the Court to the contrary, but quite in accord with the real thrust of Rule 38. It also seems to be recognized by attorneys who regularly argue in their 109 . Id. at 272 n.86 (cites 11 cases for the year 1933 when two were mentioned together).
110. Id. at 272 n.85. 111. Frankfurter and Hart, The Bu, iness of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934 , 49 HARv. L. REv. 68, 87 n.39 (1935 .
112. Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business bf the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 1936 , 51 HAav. L. Ray. 577, 595 n.32 (1938 .
113. Ibid. 114. This raises the same questions as were considered under conflict of circuits, supra. Here a solution is less pressing since this reason is urged infrequently.
115. Frankfurter and Hart, supra n6te 104, at 273. 116. Ibid. 117. Id. at 274; Frankfurter and Hart, supra note 111, at 83 n.37. briefs the unjustness or justness of the decision below."' Strangely enough, the emphasis on merit occurs with a strange twist in the case of appeals.' Of those not dismissed 63% are affirmed and 37% are reversed, the exact opposite from certiorari. This may be explained by the fact that there seems to be a feeling of need for maintaining the delicate balance between the state and the federal courts and therefore of a reluctance to reverse state action. Also in appeals from the federal courts-most of which are from three judge district courts -the issue of substantiality has already been argued out. This may not only .account for the less frequent dismissal of federal appeals, but also, for less stress on merit, because of the limited discretion to choose. This, however, does not explain the strong percentage of affirmance to reversal. 34 (1948-9) . 120. REv. 119, 122 (1949) (Table II) . ** The difference between this figure and that given in Table II as to number of certiorari granted is explained by the fact that three cases were granted certiorari and later dismissed without a ruling on the merits. Another factor which seems to influence the Court is the severity of the penalty imposed on the individual petitioners in criminal cases. This is natural even if its importance is denied.' 2 6 The figures below may be misleading to a degree, since most of the criminal cases probably arise on the Miscellaneous Docket,1 7 in in form pauperis, and are not included here. Of the eleven capital cases on the Appellate Docket this past term, certiorari was granted in nine. 2 Last year, although comparative figures are not available, four capital cases were reviewed by the Court.' 29 The sentences in these cases may not have been controlling although it is the opinion of the authors that in federal cases at least, 3 ' the right of review of a criminal sen- 130. This was formerly the case, from 1889-1911. But the statute was repealed on the ground that too much of the Court's time was being expended on the flood of cases reviewed on this basis. In the early years, probably because of the backlog, there was a large number but afterwards only a trickle. Thus, 51 capital cases were reviewed in 1891; 17 capital cases were reviewed in 1894; 4 capital cases were reviewed from 1908 to 1911. tence should be granted as a matter of course by the Supreme Court, 13 1 similar to the practice in New York.
118.
SUGGESTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION
It is suggested that the importance of the case should be determined by analyzing it in terms of the following dichotomy-the subject matter and the issue or the interrelationship of the two. By relating issue and subject matter (A and B) it is hoped to locate the case on a graph of. relative importance, comparable to the method by which the x and y grid network in the Cartesian system determines a point. For example, FELA cases which involve the question of whether the FELA completely covers the field or whether state law applies-b, 10-would be conceded to be more important than FELA cases Where only the sufficiency of evidence is involved-e, 10. Similarly a bankruptcy case in which the question whether the New York statute of limitations or the federal statute applies-b(i), 9-is more important than a similar case where that which is sought to be reviewed is the feasibility of a plan of re-organization--e, 9. The reverse is also true. A sufficiency of evidence question in a torts case-e, 1-may not be reviewed whereas the same question in a capital case-e, 1-may be looked into in great detail. These examples are clear-cut and to some extent represent the actual if not the systematic practice of the Court.
2
In close cases, an analysis which combines on the one side subject matter, and on the other, issue, may permit a Justice to examine the certiorari petition with a view toward consistency which, in the long run, will give lawyers an idea of what is meant by "importance."
As already stated, it is the authors' view that in capital cases arising under federal statutes regardless of the question of law raised by the petition, the writ should -issue. This should add about two to five cases to the Court's docket for a year.
Despite the infrequency with which certiorari is granted in diversity cases, the Court's time is nonetheless wasted by the certiorari petitions which regularly are filed and which involve only common law issues. 13 3 It would seem that in these cases regardless of the issue involved certiorari should be denied. ' Such a policy by the Court expressed either in a memorandum opinfon 15 or as a rule 1 3 6 would result in the elimination, speaking conservatively, of some 60 to 80 petitions a year. A valid exception could be made in Erie v. Tompkins cases.
FELA; Tort Claims Act; Jones Act; Federal Safety Appliance Act; Admiralty:--These cases are similar to those involving common law topics discussed above. They make up a large number-about 50 to 90 annually-of the petitions for certiorari with a proportionately large number of writs granted. Their similarity to common law cases would seem to warrant a similar disposition, but as seen in the 134. The Court formerly asserted such a blanket denial in the common law cases which sought review on the grounds that the decision was a violation of due process. But apparently even this is not to be relied on. 54 HARv. L. RFv. 1066 RFv. (1941 .
135. Similar to the Taft opinion in Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923 Because of the persuasive weight of one circuit court case on another, it could be assumed that if a circuit court refuses to follow the lead of another, the issue is not trivial. There is, however, a difficulty here. Almost every brief in support of certiorari cites cases in "direct conflict" with the one at bar. The solution, in the opinion of the authors, is to make the determination of the direct conflict in this field-and in others to be mentioned below-depend on the circuit court judges themselves. This can be done in either of two ways: (1) by considering the petition for certiorari if the case is cited in the opinion below as in conflict, or (2) by requiring a jurisdictional statement from the circuit court acknowledging the possible conflict. If the issues are any of the variants of b, the usual latitude of discretion should prevail. ' The Court has stated that in patent cases where the issue is one of infringement it will not ordinarily review the case unless there is a conflict of circuits.' 45 Review of patent cases .4" has dropped considerably in recent years and probably the number of certiorari petitions has also decreased. 4 7 However, where the question is one of law no such requirement is necessary. 4 " Whether or not this is wise, the point is that the Court here has clarified the matter for the lawyer.
The Court's consistent preference for taxation, criminal law, and labor cases might be noted. There has been an increased interest in anti-trust and in recent years a corresponding refusal to accept bankruptcy cases.' 49 This last tendency has provoked the suggestion in this series previously that review in this type of case be entirely eliminated except where there is a conflict in the circuits, admitted by the court of appeals.
144. Some degree of discretion is always necessary. It is not hoped to convert certiorari into a push-pull, click-click operation. Time factors among other things may dictate a refusal of certiorari in an important case. It is obvious that certain subjects become more or less important, as a result of "changing conditions and new legislation. Review thus must be somewhat cyclical. Erie v. Tompkins '15 0 and then a series of cases explaining it; Taft-Hartley and then a burst of cases interpreting it are examples. Certain statutes immediately clamor for construction-many people are seriously affected. Other statutes are slower to take effect-the Patent Act ' perhaps, or a code of civil procedure.
If the Court wishes to do more than complain about the many petitions filed which probably are "unimportant," it will have to recognize that Rule 38 as interpreted gives no standard whatsoever and that 'something has to be done so that the bar can understand "importance." The type of explanation should be twofold; first, a statement of reasons when certiorari is granted; second, periodically, in certain areas where decision has been reached not to grant certiorari, a memorandum opinion notifying the bar to this effect. The type of statement or memorandum opinion has been suggested above-one which is specific and directed toward the combination of the subject matter of the case and the issue presented in the case. Additional policies have been suggested in previous articles in this series. It is estimated that if these policies were followed, some 100 to 200 petitions a year would be eliminated and a corresponding amount of the Court's time and clients' money saved. Crim. Law and Procedure* '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 1929 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 Cert. Granted 3 1 0 2 4 3 2 4 1 0 4 2 4 8 4 Cert. Denied 4 7 3 2 0 6 2 6 0 3 14 Total 7 8 3 4 4 9 4 10 1 3 18 * One cannot tell about what was included in these figures in past years and hence whether they are really comparable. 
CONCLUSION
In concluding this and the series of articles on the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction, the writers humbly acknowledge the magnitude and complexity of the Court's problem. It is easy to criticizeespecially when there is so much room for it-but the answer is not so easy. There is little doubt that the behavior of the Court in this area is unsatisfactory-even to the Justices themselves. It may be that the meaning of a "certiorari denied" will always be disputed; that explanations of action taken or not taken cannot always feasibly be made; that what goes on behind the purple curtain may forever remain somewhat of a mystery. Perhaps, if these things are true, it is one of the inevitable compromises that must be made by men striving to be free in an epoch of complexity and anxiety. One point remains clear: the work which the Supreme Court does not do is as important as the work which it does.
Following are the usual facts and figures on the Court's nonfeasance for the 1952 term. 
WORK OF THE TERM
